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I. INTRODUCTION

In Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, the Supreme Court granted certiorari
to address the following question: Does Congress have the power to
confer standing upon an individual claiming that a privately owned
website violated its federal statutory obligation to take specified steps
designed to promote accuracy in aggregating and reporting his
personal and financial data even if the resulting false disclosures did
not produce concrete harm?1 This somewhat arcane standing issue
involves congressional power to broaden the scope of the first of three
*
Professor of Law and Marbury Research Professor, Associate Dean of Research and
Faculty Development, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law. I would like to
thank Richard Boldt, Bob Pushaw, and Aaron Zelinsky for their extremely helpful comments,
and Sue McCarty for her tremendously thorough work on proofing, editing, and citation. I also
received insightful comments from those who participated in the Maryland Carey Law Legal
Theory Workshop, and Linda Morris and Matthew Sarna provided excellent research assistance.
1.
The formal statement for which certiorari was granted is: “Whether Congress may
confer Article III standing upon a plaintiff who suffers no concrete harm, and who therefore
could not otherwise invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court, by authorizing a private right of
action based on a bare violation of a federal statute.” Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at *i,
Spokeo v. Robins, No. 13-1339 (May 1, 2014), 2014 WL 1802228 (U.S. petition for cert. filed May
1, 2014).
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constitutional standing requirements: injury in fact, causation, and
redressability. Although the case does not directly address the
prudential standing elements—no right to enforce the rights of others
or to litigate diffuse harms—this Essay will demonstrate that along
with the remaining constitutional elements of standing, the analysis
also implicates these prudential barriers.2
Spokeo presents a valuable opportunity to solidify standing
doctrine’s proper constitutional foundations. This Essay demonstrates
that properly understood, standing doctrine is designed to preserve
and protect congressional primacy in lawmaking. This includes
deferring to Congress’s policy decision concerning who has standing to
enforce its statutes.
The financial stakes for the claimant (as opposed to his classaction attorneys and the defendant),3 are fairly small, set at a
statutory minimum of $100 and maximum of $1000 per alleged willful
violation;4 as this Essay argues, the stakes for separation of powers
are significant. The lower court opinions and the Supreme Court briefs
present detailed technical standing arguments, and although not
without their flaws, they aptly survey several core doctrinal issues.
There is a sense in reading them, however, that the forest has gotten
lost in the trees.5 The question presented—Congress’s power to define
a technical statutory violation, affecting but not concretely harming an
individual for purposes of the Article III injury-in-fact requirement—
goes to fundamental principles of separation of powers. This important

2.
In Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014), Justice
Scalia, writing for a unanimous Court, denied standing to Static Control, for a counterclaim
under the Lanham Act against Lexmark. Id. at 1395. The case involved a deceptive practices
claim arising from communications that Lexmark had sent to its customers, who also did
business with Static, but not directly to Static, warning those customers against employing
Static products to refurbish Lexmark cartridges. Id. at 1383–84. The Lexmark majority recast
the “zone of interest” test, developed in Association of Data Processing Service Org. v. Camp, 397
U.S. 150 (1970), which had long been understood to be a prudential standing barrier, to instead
operate as part of a broader question of statutory interpretation involving who has the right to
raise the statutory claim. Id. at 1388. More notably, Justice Scalia also suggested in dicta that
the diffuse harm standing barrier, which had also long been viewed as prudential, is better
understood as a constitutional standing element. Id. at 1387 n.3. Because Spokeo does not turn
on the prudential standing elements or on the claim of diffuse harm even if that is treated as a
constitutional standing element, this Essay does not explore that question.
3.
This class action suit has the potential to produce a rather enormous judgment if
allowed to proceed, or more likely, to force a significant settlement as a means of avoiding such a
judgment.
4.
15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a). Had the violation merely been negligent, he would have been
limited to seemingly non-existent actual damages. Id.
5.
This has long been a problem among those assessing standing doctrine. See Maxwell L.
Stearns, Standing Back from the Forest: Justiciability and Social Choice, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1309
(1995).
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aspect of the case has likely been suppressed due to a natural
tendency among lower courts and lawyers to emphasize how cases can
be reconciled,6 and more to the point, to show that such reconciliation
inexorably leads to the result they claim should obtain.7 Rare (and
perhaps unwise) is the litigant who emphasizes a fundamental tension
pervading the relevant doctrines, or that coming out for petitioner
forces a strained reading in one direction, whereas coming out for
respondent forces a strained reading in the other. Fortunately, as a
law professor, I have the luxury to say just that, and I have written
this Essay in that spirit. To be sure, I too will claim that my position is
reconcilable with the precedents—it actually is—but my true objective
is to show, plain as day, what the doctrinal tension is, how it arose,
why resolving it matters.
The case facts are as follows: Robins discovered that Spokeo, a
website that profits from aggregating and disclosing personal and
financial data, failed to abide by a set of statutory requirements,

6.
As one example, Respondent’s brief maintains: “Statutory rights are as worthy of
judicial protection as common-law and constitutional rights because ‘there is absolutely no basis
for making the Article III inquiry turn on the source of the asserted right.’” Brief of Respondent
at *24, Spokeo v. Robins, No. 13-1339 (Aug. 31, 2015), 2015 WL 5169094 (U.S. petition for cert.
filed May 1, 2014) (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576 (1992)). Perhaps not
surprisingly, counsel does not point out the ironic nature of the posit in the context of the Lujan
case. See infra note 45, and accompanying text. Robins’s counsel further maintains: “Congress
may not ‘abandon[ ] the requirement that the party seeking [redress in federal court] must
himself have suffered an injury’” and that “‘[t]he province of the court,’ after all, ‘is, solely, to
decide on the rights of individuals.’” Id. (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 170 (1803)).
Although Robins’s counsel uses this as a basis to distinguish Lujan, the Lujan framing of these
issues tends to favor Respondent and derives from that opinion’s premise-shifting account of
standing.
For its part, counsel for Spokeo cite Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc.,
528 U.S. 167, 180–81 (2000), for the following proposition:
To demonstrate standing, a plaintiff bears the burden of showing that he
(1) has suffered an “injury in fact” that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b)
actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to
the challenged action of the defendant; and
(3) it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a
favorable decision.
Brief for Petitioner at *11–12, Spokeo v. Robins, No. 13-1339 (July 2, 2015), 2015 WL 4148655
(U.S. petition for cert. filed May 1, 2014). But the Laidlaw majority recognized a Clean Water Act
permit violation as satisfying the requirement of a justiciable injury notwithstanding its
determination that the violation produced no concrete harm to the environment, thus placing
that case in tension with Spokeo’s argument on the very point for which the case is cited. See
infra at 231.
7.
This is also a natural consequence of the Supreme Court’s proper admonition that it
reviews judgments not opinions. Chevron USA v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842
(1984) (“Nevertheless, since this Court reviews judgments, not opinions, we must determine
whether the Court of Appeals’ legal error resulted in an erroneous judgment on the validity of
the regulations.”) (footnote omitted).
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codified in the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”),8 that are designed
to improve reporting accuracy. The consequence for Robins was the
disclosure of false factual assertions about him that some might
consider a compliment: He was reported as married (he’s single), as
having a job (he’s unemployed), and as having a specific set of
professional credentials (he lacks them). It is not beyond
comprehension that seemingly benign false disclosures might be
harmful, and the brief for Robins presents the arguments.9 Were the
Court to find a concrete injury in fact, Robins would prevail, but the
case would be rendered trivial. There are other jumping off points as
well.10 For an example going in the other direction, the Court could
construe the statutory cause of action as insufficiently specific to
confer Article III standing.11 The case is only interesting, however, on
the assumption that it presents the issue for which certiorari was
granted, and for the rest of this Essay, I therefore assume away such
tangential inquiries.
We now assume, therefore, that Robins suffered no concrete
harm, or at least no harm sufficient to satisfy the injury-in-fact
requirement but for the statute, and that his standing claim rests
solely on the violated statutory obligation to take more careful steps in
gathering and reporting his personal information. We must further
assume that Spokeo’s failure to abide by the statutory care
requirements was willful. Under the statute, Robins is entitled only to
actual damages if the violation is negligent, and to statutory damages
if it is willful.12 Assuming no concrete harm, therefore, damages can
only arise in the event of willful conduct. For Spokeo, the statutory
damages create the possibility of a large adverse verdict—or perhaps
more likely, a significant settlement—as Robins is the named plaintiff
in a class action suit, another issue beyond this Essay’s scope.13 To
8.
Fair Credit Reporting Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1128 (1970) (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 1681 et seq.).
9.
As examples: The site advertises itself as available for prospective romantic partners
who might be deterred and prospective employers might think Robins dishonestly represented
his skills or who might think that his income or other work requirements render him ineligible
for positions for which he is appropriately suited. Brief of Respondent, supra note 6, at *44–45 &
n.6.
10. An argument in Robins’s favor would advocate less stringent standing requirements
when the claimant relying on a federal statute sues a private entity, as in the Spokeo case, but
more stringent requirements when the claimant sues a government official, including a suit for
injunctive relief. For an analysis critical of this distinction, see infra at 235.
11. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 6, at *10–11.
12. FCRA, 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a).
13. This Essay will not address the interplay between the statutory cause of action and the
issue of class certification. Rather, it will focus exclusively on whether the statutory violation
provides the basis for standing for Robins as the named plaintiff.
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sharpen the inquiry, let’s further assume that even if Spokeo had
undertaken the statutorily required additional steps to reduce the
likelihood of false disclosures, it might not have identified, and thus
might not have avoided, the mistakes affecting Robins that gave rise
to the suit. This makes plain the purely procedural nature of Robins’s
claim: The question is whether, on these stringent facts, Congress had
the power define Robins as injured for Article III standing purposes.
This Essay will explain why an affirmative answer is essential to
preserving the separation-of-powers foundations of standing doctrine.
A. Summary of Argument (and a Comment on Terminology)
This Essay’s thesis is easily expressed: Properly understood,
the primary purpose of standing doctrine is to ensure congressional
primacy in policy making. This includes its presumptive role in
monitoring the executive branch without undue judicial interference.
Although there are circumstances in which the judiciary must
interfere with legislative policymaking prerogatives, constitutional
standing doctrines cabin such judicial power to a specific and narrow
class of circumstances. An essential aspect of congressional
policymaking autonomy involves its choice of means in monitoring the
executive branch. As a corollary, Congress has the power to determine
the conditions under which private individuals can supplement, or
even displace, executive enforcement through such devices as citizen
and taxpayer suits. Modern standing case law developments have lost
sight of the doctrine’s critical function in preserving congressional
regulatory and monitoring powers, and have instead shifted the
doctrine’s focus toward protecting executive enforcement discretion
from judicial encroachment. These two competing premises—standing
as protecting congressional monitoring of the executive branch versus
standing as preserving executive enforcement discretion from judicial
encroachment—are ultimately irreconcilable.14 The Spokeo case helps
to demonstrate the importance of restoring standing doctrine to the
first, proper separation-of-powers foundation.
Before proceeding, it is important to offer a brief comment on
nomenclature. As the analysis below reveals, the Court has identified
two aspects of standing doctrine, one deemed constitutional and the
other prudential, with both sets of implications derived from the
Article III case or controversy requirement. The term “constitutional
14. And this holds even if, as Respondent appears to suggest, a narrow holding might allow
those premises to be reconciled as applied to this case, for example, by claiming that the
connection to Robins of the claimed statutory violation suffices to satisfy the Lujan injury-in-fact
test. Brief of Respondent, supra note 6, at *24–25.
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standing elements” refers to a set of requirements that Congress and
the judiciary are duty bound to observe. These are contrasted with
“prudential standing elements,” which Congress generally has the
power to waive by expressly or impliedly conferring standing by
statute, and which the federal judiciary, in its discretion, can relax in
particular cases based on a variety of policy considerations. In
addition, litigants can claim standing based either on a constitutional
provision, typically but not exclusively equal protection, or on a
federal statute. The term “constitutional standing” means reliance on
the Constitution, as opposed to a federal statute, as the basis for
standing. This is contrasted with “statutory standing,” meaning an
express or implied statutory conferral.15 Unless the context dictates
otherwise, in the analysis that follows, I will use the terms
“constitutional standing elements,” “constitutional standing,” and
“statutory standing” as described here.
II. STANDING DOCTRINE’S THREE-LEGGED STOOL
The analysis returns us to first principles. Compare Marbury v.
Madison,16 the case in which the Supreme Court formally established
the power of constitutional judicial review, with Allen v. Wright,17 a
case that articulated what I will call the conventional separation-ofpowers theory of the modern standing doctrine.18 These are familiar
cases to most readers, and the comparison does not require a detailed
factual analysis of either; instead, the goal is to generate a set of
parallel framings. After this initial comparison, we expand the scope,
invoking as well the corpus of criminal procedure case law, thus
allowing three-way comparison. The resulting “three-legged stool”
provides the theoretical foundation of standing, and it serves as the
starting point for the second stage inquiry, comparing claims of
standing that rest on the Constitution with those that rest instead on
a federal statute.
In Marbury, the Supreme Court, with Chief Justice Marshall
writing, declined to issue a writ of mandamus ordering Secretary of
State James Madison to deliver Marbury a promised commission for
which the President’s signature had been affixed, the document had
15. The terminology is further complicated by the doctrinal tension relevant to this very
case concerning the scope of congressional power to relax or expand the reach of the
constitutional standing elements, including injury in fact.
16. 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
17. 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
18. By this, I simply mean that Allen rested on a set of already developed Supreme Court
doctrines concerning the constitutional and prudential standing elements.
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been sealed, but alas, the final step, delivery to Marbury himself, had
not occurred.19 The fatal defect, one that the Chief Justice himself
helped to create, did not give rise to a discretionary choice on the part
of President Thomas Jefferson, who refused to order his subordinate,
James Madison, to deliver it up.20 Chief Justice John Marshall made
plain that President Jefferson, the successor to President John
Adams, who had signed the commission and affixed the seal, had a
ministerial obligation to compel the delivery.21 Even so, the Marbury
Court rejected the plea for mandamus, an otherwise appropriate writ,
to compel the delivery of the commission due to a fatal jurisdictional
defect in § 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which in Marshall’s reading
empowered the Supreme Court to issue it as a matter of original
jurisdiction.22 Marshall combined his reading of § 13 with a
construction of Article III, § 2, clause 2, as authorizing the Supreme
Court to grant the writ only as a matter of appellate jurisdiction. The
effect was to render the jurisdiction-conferring statute ultra vires, or
unconstitutional, thus forcing the Court to resolve whether it had the
power to decline to exercise original jurisdiction in the case despite
Congress’s contrary statutory command.
Marshall resolved that question with dispatch: “It is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say
what the law is,”23 making plain that the Court had the power and
duty not only to construe the statute, but also to construe and apply
the Constitution as a source of higher law when, as in Marbury, the
two sources of law conflict. We can now express the Marbury holding
as follows: When Congress acts (by passing the statute) and when its
action violates the Constitution (creating a conflict with the
Constitution), in a proper case or controversy, the Supreme Court will
invalidate congressional action (striking the law down).
Now compare Allen v. Wright.24 In Allen, the Supreme Court
was called upon to apply the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection
Clause to invalidate an Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) policy
through which institutions, including private schools, operating under
the umbrella of another organization that had already been granted
tax-exempt status, received that status as a result of abbreviated
review. A nationwide class of African-American parents alleged that a

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Marbury, 5 U.S. at 155.
Id. at 162.
Id.
Id. at 175–76.
Id. at 177.
468 U.S. 737 (1984).

228

VAND. L. REV. EN BANC

[Vol. 68:221

consequence had been to confer tax-exempt status on private schools
throughout the United States despite their having engaged in racially
discriminatory practices that would have disqualified them under an
independent merits-based assessment. These parents further alleged
that as a consequence of the de facto subsidization of private school
discrimination, the public schools that their children attended were
victims of white flight. The effect, they claimed, was to inhibit
desegregation of those public schools their children attended.
Justice O’Connor, writing for the Allen majority, denied the
parents standing, claiming that it was first and foremost the job of
Congress, not the courts, to monitor executive conduct, including
through its power of the purse.25 Congress could have accomplished
such monitoring through various means. For example, Congress could
remove tax-exempt status for private schools across the board, or it
could, more narrowly, demand that such schools be assessed for tax
exempt status on their individual merits without regard to the
previously conferred status of a parent organization. In effect, the
Allen holding implies that the Court is presumptively disinclined to
step in to select among Congress’s choice of means.
25. The Allen Court stated:
The idea of separation of powers that underlies standing doctrine explains why our
cases preclude the conclusion that respondents’ alleged injury “fairly can be traced to
the challenged action” of the IRS. That conclusion would pave the way generally for
suits challenging, not specifically identifiable Government violations of law, but the
particular programs agencies establish to carry out their legal obligations. Such suits,
even when premised on allegations of several instances of violations of law, are rarely,
if ever appropriate for federal-court adjudication.
“Carried to its logical end, [respondents’] approach would have the federal courts as
virtually continuing monitors of the wisdom and soundness of Executive action; such a
role is appropriate for the Congress acting through its committees and the ‘power of
the purse’; it is not the role of the judiciary, absent actual present or immediately
threatened injury resulting from unlawful governmental action.”
Id. at 759–60 (alteration in original) (citations omitted). The Allen Court further recognized the
obligation under Article III “against recognizing standing in a case brought, not to enforce
specific legal obligations whose violation works a direct harm, but to seek a restructuring of the
apparatus established by the Executive Branch to fulfill its legal duties.” Id. at 761. This
principle hearkens back to the admonition in Marbury v. Madison that the power of judicial
review cannot be construed to allow judiciary to interfere with discretionary, or non-ministerial,
executive prerogatives.
The complication in Allen that distinguished it from more conventional cases alleging
ongoing constitutional violations is that striking the IRS policy would have forced a judicial
restructuring of executive agency operations without, at the same time, ensuring meaningful
relief, at least if such relief is defined in terms of furthering the racial integration of public
schools that the claimants’ children attended. This explains Justice O’Connor’s reliance on
identified links in the chain of causation as implicating a problem of redressability. Id. at 768
(identifying four causal links involving parties not before the Court). As discussed infra at 232,
whereas in conventional litigation injury, causation, and redressability typically coalesce, Allen
illustrates an instance of institutional litigation in which they split apart, thus helping to explain
their emergence as separate standing elements.
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We can now express the Allen holding in parallel with the
stylized presentation of Marbury presented above: When Congress
fails to act (by failing to specify what happens when the IRS employs a
problematic method of determining tax exempt status) and when that
failure to act is alleged to violate the Constitution (thus violating the
Equal Protection Clause by conferring tax exempt status on
discriminatory private schools), the Supreme Court will not invalidate
congressional inaction by acting on Congress’s behalf (thus declining to
strike down the IRS policy).26
Despite the seeming parallelism of these two cases, implying
that the Court will act on affirmative unconstitutional congressional
action but will hold back on congressional inaction that generates
unconstitutional results, a third case category stands in marked
contrast with the second. In this case category, Congress (or a state
general assembly) fails to act, its failure to act produces an alleged
constitutional violation, and the federal judiciary, including the
Supreme Court in a proper case or controversy, routinely steps in and
acts on the legislature’s behalf. This is, of course, the premise of the
body of Criminal Procedure case law, which thus provides the third
and final leg to the constitutional standing stool. In such cases as
Weeks v. United States,27 Mapp v. Ohio,28 and Miranda v. Arizona,29
the problem was not the failure to apply the exclusionary rule (Mapp
and Weeks) or to issue Miranda warnings (Miranda). After all, those
rules were crafted (or extended) in these very cases. Rather, the
problem was the violation, through state or federal executive conduct,
of a constitutional requirement, here arising under the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments (as applied in Mapp and Miranda to the States via the
Fourteenth Amendment), but with no legislative command (or with
legislative inaction) as to the remedy that follows that violation.
The Court in Allen established that in the ordinary course of
constitutional litigation, it will defer to Congress as the primary
source of lawmaking authority even at the price of condoning some
alleged ongoing constitutional violations that allow Congress to fulfill
its primary function as monitor of the executive branch. In Criminal
Procedure cases, the Court conversely implies that when individuals
are subject to the most significant sanctions that a state can impose—
criminal penalties, including death—it cannot await possible

26. For a preliminary presentation of this framing, see Maxwell L. Stearns, The Misguided
Renaissance of Social Choice, 103 YALE L.J. 1219, 1261–62 n.158 (1994).
27. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
28. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
29. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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legislative intervention; rather, it is duty bound (consistent with
Marbury’s “province and duty”) to pronounce federal constitutional
common law as needed to provide an appropriate remedy for the
identified constitutional violation.30
Certainly one can disagree with the Allen v. Wright outcome,
and we can also find cases that appear in tension with it, for example,
the body of standing case law that involves challenges to race-based
affirmative action.31 And yet, these cases help to form the basis for a
robust account of constitutional standing case law. This account casts
these combined standing cases, along with the body of criminal
procedure case law,32 along a normative spectrum. That spectrum
involves whether, based on objective factors, each case presents
primarily as a vehicle to create precedent, without necessarily
providing meaningful relief to the claimant, or instead, presents as a
means of securing relief, with the creation of precedent as a
consequence or byproduct. The analysis develops from the intuition
that the order in which cases are presented can have a profound effect
on the substantive case law that develops, and standing doctrine
works to limit the power of litigants to manipulate case law orderings
for maximum doctrinal effect by presumptively requiring a set of
fortuitous factors that give rise to a justiciable harm as a precondition

30. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177. Although Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000),
might suggest that criminal procedure cases are mandatory rather than constitutional common
law, and are therefore not subject to displacement by Congress, a better reading suggests that if
Congress chooses to displace a rule of constitutional criminal procedure, it must devise an
alternative that is constitutionally adequate. See id. at 437. Replacing Miranda warnings with a
balancing test, the very approach that the Supreme Court rejected in Miranda v. Arizona, failed
that test.
31. For a discussion that compares Board of Regents v. Bakke, see MAXWELL L. STEARNS,
CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS: A SOCIAL CHOICE ANALYSIS OF SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING
30–36, 271–81 (2002). The analysis does not turn on whether the nominal litigants in these cases
subjectively intended to create law; rather, it turns on whether objective factors make the case
appear as a vehicle for precedent creation or instead for securing relief. Id.
32. This includes criminal procedure cases in which the strong presumption as to standing
to raise the claim appears misplaced. See, e.g., Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 416 (1991) (allowing
white criminal defendant to raise equal protection challenge to race-based exclusion of African
American juror under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986)); Campbell v. Louisiana, 523 U.S.
392, 398–401 (1998) (extending Powers in context of exclusion of foreperson based on race in
grand jury indictment). Under traditional third party standing principles, there would be no
personal injury for a white criminal defendant to raise a Batson claim as the juror exclusion was
not based on his race, leading to the circular proposition that a white defendant can raise the
racial exclusion of an African American juror because doing so provides the white defendant a
basis for relief if relief is granted. For a more detailed discussion, see STEARNS, supra note 31, at
259–63. See also Powers, 499 U.S. at 1426 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(stating that he cannot “understand how the rights of blacks excluded from jury service can be
vindicated by letting a white murderer to go free.”).
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to standing to sue.33 My purpose here is not to provide a
comprehensive doctrinal review of constitutional standing or to
present such a doctrinal reconciliation.34 Instead it is to construct the
basic architecture of constitutional standing as a prelude to comparing
the more specific question of statutory standing at issue in Spokeo.
III. LUJAN AND THE PROBLEM OF STATUTORY STANDING
Before delving into modern statutory standing doctrine, a bit of
historical background will be helpful. Legal historians have
documented that the modern justiciability doctrines, including
standing, find their origins in the Progressive Era. The linkage is not
fortuitous. A central purpose of standing doctrine at its ProgressiveEra inception was to provide a judicial mechanism of insulating
ambitious, and previously unseen, developments in the regulatory
state from constitutional challenge. As William Fletcher,35 and
others,36 have aptly demonstrated, one method by which Louis
Brandeis and Felix Frankfurter accomplished this goal was through a
regime of presumptions: If Congress conferred or denied standing in
particular statutes, those rules would apply; faced instead with
congressional silence, the judiciary would analogize to doctrines of
contract, tort, or property to see if the alleged injury was of the sort
that was cognizable at common law. A feature of this regime was to
favor standing for those who suffered traditional harms as regulatory
33. For an analysis that assesses the corpus of standing case law against this theory, see
STEARNS, supra note 31; see also Maxwell L. Stearns, Standing Back from the Forest:
Justiciability and Social Choice, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1309 (1995) [hereinafter Justiciability and
Social Choice]; Maxwell L. Stearns, Standing and Social Choice: Historical Evidence, 144 U. PA.
L. REV. 309 (1995) [hereinafter Standing and Social Choice].
34. For interested readers, I have provided such a review in several published sources. See
STEARNS, supra note 31; Stearns, Justiciability and Social Choice, supra note 33; Stearns,
Standing and Social Choice, supra note 33.
35. See William Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221 (1998). For a
symposium celebrating the twenty-fifth anniversary of this publication, see Symposium, The
Structure of Standing at 25, 65 ALA. L. REV. 269 (2013) (with contributions by Heather Elliott,
William Fletcher, Tara Grove, Andy Hessick, Bob Pushaw, Tom Rowe, Jonathan Siegel, Maxwell
Stearns, Ernest Young). The contributors to this on-line symposium overlap with the Alabama
symposium. (Heather Elliott, Andy Hessick, Jonathan Siegel, Joan Steinman, Maxwell Stearns,
Howard Wasserman). One Essay bridges the two symposia by extending Fletcher’s analysis to
the Spokeo case. See Howard M. Wasserman, Fletcherian Standing, Merits, and Spokeo, Inc. v.
Robins, 68 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 257, 268–70 (2015).
36. For a review of the literature, see Stearns, Justiciability and Social Choice, supra note
33, at 366–67 and cites therein (discussing works by William Fletcher, Steven Winter, and Gene
Nichol). See also Robert J. Pushaw Jr., Fortuity and the Article III “Case”: A Critique of Fletcher’s
The Structure of Standing, 65 ALA. L. REV. 289, 295–303 (2013) (reviewing history and
developing argument for a fortuitous injury requirement derived from the Article III Case or
Controversy clause.)
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objects as compared with those whose claimed injury resulted from
insufficiently aggressive regulatory enforcement. This onceProgressive understanding of standing doctrine allowed Congress to
play a central role not only in the development of regulatory policy,
but also in the legislative selection of means by which such policies
would be enforced.
Today, commentators tend to view strict standing doctrine as
conservative, and case outcomes like Allen provide fodder for this
position, although there are also counter examples.37 The ideological
valence of standing, however, becomes more complicated in the
context of statutory conferrals. Consider the landmark, and
controversial, 1992 decision, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife.38 In Lujan,
the Court denied two women who had previously traveled to Egypt
and Sri Lanka standing to force statutorily required interagency
consultation between the Department of Commerce and the
Department of the Interior, prior to federal funding of projects
threatening the habitats of endangered species abroad, which had not
occurred with respect to the affected projects in those countries.39
Despite the broad statutory conferral of standing to persons who
claimed injury nexuses—vocational, animal, ecosystem—Justice
Scalia, writing for a majority, denied standing.40 Scalia reasoned that
the mere desire to have the government abide by the law without a
more concrete personal harm, for example, one analogous to an injury
cognizable at common law, was inadequate for standing
notwithstanding the congressional grant.41 Scalia grounded his
holding in the observation that the President, not the courts, holds the
power to execute legislative policy, and that the statutory conferral, if
relied upon to grant standing, would result in judicial encroachment of
executive enforcement prerogatives.
Scalia stated:
To permit Congress to convert the undifferentiated public interest in executive officers’
compliance with the law into an “individual right” vindicable in the courts is to permit
Congress to transfer from the President to the courts the Chief Executive’s most
important constitutional duty, to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” It
would enable the courts, with the permission of Congress, “to assume a position of
authority over the governmental acts of another and co-equal department,” and to

37.
text.
38.
39.
40.
41.

See, e.g., infra note 47, and accompanying text, and notes 69-71, and accompanying
504 U.S. 555 (1992).
Id. at 563, 578.
Id. at 566.
Id. at 573–75.
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become “‘virtually continuing monitors of the wisdom and soundness of Executive
action.’”42

Scalia claimed this reading was consistent with Marbury: “‘The
province of the court,’ as Chief Justice Marshall said in Marbury v.
Madison, ‘is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals.’”43 Notably
Justice Scalia omitted the immediately following Marbury passage:
But, if this be not such a question; if so far from being an intrusion into the secrets of
the cabinet, it respects a paper, which, according to law, is upon record, and to a copy of
which the law gives a right, on the payment of ten cents; if it be no intermeddling with a
subject, over which the executive can be considered as having exercised any control;
what is there in the exalted station of the officer, which shall bar a citizen from
asserting, in a court of justice, his legal rights, or shall forbid a court to listen to the
claim; or to issue a mandamus, directing the performance of a duty, not depending on
executive discretion, but on particular acts of congress and the general principles of law?
If one of the heads of departments commits any illegal act, under color of his office, by
which an individual sustains an injury, it cannot be pretended that his office alone
exempts him from being sued in the ordinary mode of proceeding, and being compelled
to obey the judgment of the law.44

More simply put, Marbury does not establish that the judiciary
is barred from compelling executive officials to perform their
ministerial obligations. Instead, it establishes the less controversial
proposition that the judiciary may not cabin executive discretion. Of
course, Marbury v. Madison did not involve executive discretion, and
that was Marshall’s point. The Court lacked jurisdiction because the
statute was unconstitutional even though mandamus was otherwise
proper to compel a purely ministerial executive obligations.
Left open in Marbury is the scope of Congress’s power to define
as personal an injury that extends well beyond the boundaries of
common law harms, a point to which we now turn. Most of Scalia’s
Lujan analysis centered on rejecting the nominal claimants’ injury in
fact. Scalia implicitly acknowledged this line of analysis ran up
against a tradition of judicial latitude toward congressional conferral
of standing, including broadening of traditional notions of injury. Thus
Justice Scalia stated: “Nothing in this contradicts the principle that
‘[t]he . . . injury required by Art. III may exist solely by virtue of
statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates
standing.’”45 Of course disclaiming a contradiction does not prove none
exists. Consider Justice Blackmun’s dissenting rejoinder, which
Justice O’Connor, the Allen majority opinion author, joined:
42. Id. at 577 (citations omitted).
43. Lujan, 504 U.S at 576 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 170 (1803)).
44. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 170.
45. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 578 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (quoting Linda R.S.
v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 n.3 (1973))).
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The Court expresses concern that allowing judicial enforcement of “agencies’ observance
of a particular, statutorily prescribed procedure” would “transfer from the President to
the courts the Chief Executive’s most important constitutional duty, to ‘take Care that
the Laws be faithfully executed.’ In fact, the principal effect of foreclosing judicial
enforcement of such procedures is to transfer power into the hands of the Executive at
the expense—not of the courts—but of Congress, from which that power originates and
emanates.46

Although both Allen and Lujan denied standing, it is not
surprising that Justice O’Connor joined the Blackmun Lujan dissent.
That is because the dissent was consistent with the traditional Allen
separation-of-powers theory of standing, one that Lujan appeared to
displace. Consistent with Allen, Blackmun determined that Congress
has the power to choose its preferred enforcement methods, including
through broadening standing to create a basis for supplemental
private enforcement. That is because the very policies sought to be
enforced emanate not from the executive branch—the branch with
enforcement power—but from Congress “from which that power
originates and emanates.”
Indeed, it is not surprising that Justice Scalia’s Lujan premise
has not been universally embraced. In the 2000 case, Friends of the
Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc.,47 the Supreme Court,
with Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg writing, permitted a suit against
Laidlaw for a technical permit violation under the Clean Water Act
that did not result in any identifiable harm to the claimants.48 Sound
familiar? The Laidlaw case originally presented on mootness grounds,
and Justice Ginsburg, writing for the majority, rejected the mootness
claim. She and Justice Scalia, writing in dissent, also used the case to
revisit the Allen/Lujan debate. This time, the Laidlaw majority found
standing and restored, at least temporarily, the doctrine’s
congressional primacy foundation.
In Laidlaw, a Clean Water Act permit violation resulted in the
emission of effluents into a river near where claimants resided, but at
levels that produced no identifiable environmental damage, and thus
no discernible harm to the claimants. Indeed, there is some evidence
that the violation followed from an erroneous calculation in the permit
itself, thereby rendering the emissions entirely safe.49 Despite this,

46. Id. at 602 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
47. 528 U.S. 167 (2000).
48. Id. at 183–84.
49. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Issues Raised by Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental
Services: Access to the Courts for Environmental Plaintiffs, 11 DUKE ENVTL L. & POL’Y F. 207,
233–35 (2001) (explaining that emissions did not render water unsafe based on review of
Supreme Court Brief Amicus Curiae of the State of South Carolina, and the District Court
opinion, demonstrating calculation errors in permitting); see also Maxwell L. Stearns, From
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claimants averred that the violation inhibited their enjoyment of the
river, and on this basis the Court allowed the suit against Laidlaw to
proceed.50
Consider the following exchange between Justice Ginsburg for
the Laidlaw majority, and Justice Scalia, writing in dissent. Justice
Scalia rejected standing based on the absence of an injury in fact,
stating: “While it is perhaps possible that a plaintiff could be harmed
even though the environment was not, such a plaintiff would have the
burden of articulating the nature of the injury.”51 One might imagine a
basis for satisfying even this restrictive scope of permissible injury if
the publicity attendant the permit violation diminished property
values. Even setting aside that possibility, which did not affect the
majority analysis, Justice Ginsburg directly challenged Scalia’s
premise:
The relevant showing for Article III standing . . . is not injury to the environment but
injury to the plaintiff. To insist upon the former rather than the latter . . . is to raise the
standing hurdle higher than the necessary showing for success on the merits in an
action alleging noncompliance with [the required] permit.52

The permit was issued pursuant to a statutory scheme, thereby
establishing that there is no need for a concrete injury—or that
Congress could define the permit violation itself as an injury for
Article III purposes—where the basis for standing rests on a federal
statute as opposed to the Constitution itself. We can compare the
Ginsburg and Scalia approaches based on a conventional set of linear
relationships from (1) permit violation to (2) individual harm to (3)
justiciable injury. This, after all, is the way common law adjudication
customarily proceeds. An event, for example a negligent act, a breach
of contract, or a violated property right produces an injury to a
plaintiff,53 and the courts treat that injury as the basis for a cognizable
common law suit.

Lujan to Laidlaw: A Preliminary Assessment of Environmental Standing, 11 DUKE ENVTL. L. &
POL’Y F. 321, 379 (2001).
50. For an assessment of the various claims of injury in Laidlaw, see Stearns, supra note
49, at 381–83.
51. 528 U.S. at 714 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
52. Id. at 703–04.
53. One might characterize an unobserved trespass that causes no property damage as a
legal violation without injury to the property owner, even though the common law defines the
trespass as the basis for a legal claim. Of course most persons do not press such trespass
violations in court (consider the frequency of turning a car around in a property owner’s
driveway). The claimed injury for those who do resembles Professor Fletcher’s observation that a
non-lying person claiming to be injured by a legal violation, is, in fact, injured, leaving open the
policy question as to which of these injuries we allow to have pressed in court. Fletcher, supra
note 35, at 231.
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In that framing, all of the features that have become requisites
to standing are rolled into one: The injury is caused by the defendant,
and finding for plaintiff will remedy that injury.54 These also tie in the
prudential barriers: the claimant raises his or her own claim, and
therefore the claim is not diffuse. This coalescence explains something
critical about standing doctrine. The Court devised its doctrine with
reference to the common law not because each standing criterion
carries independent normative significance, but rather because these
features conventionally coexisted in suits that for hundreds—nay
thousands—of years were resolved in legal forums. This includes such
ancient texts as the Code of Hammurabi and the Five Books of Moses,
both of which created the basis for many legal claims that today would
fall within the scope of the common law.
But this feature of the common law, or more ancient codes,
does not answer whether in our constitutional scheme of separation of
powers, Congress holds the power to broaden the ambit of harms that
it chooses to define as the basis for a cognizable injury. This also
answers Spokeo’s argument that allowing Congress to define injury
collapses the three constitutional standing prongs into one.55 This
observation merely restates what we have long known: just as these
features coalesce within traditional common law suits, so too they do
so when Congress defines a justiciable injury by statute.
In Laidlaw, Justice Ginsburg did not disclaim that the
conventional litigation model in which these standing factors are
combined remains dominant. That, after all, has been the basis for
legal disputes from time immemorial. Rather, she claimed that in our
system of representative governance, when there is no express or
implied source of constitutional limitation to its policy, Congress has
the wherewithal both to create policy and to determine its preferred
method of enforcement. The enforcement schemes can be varied, and
they can include executive enforcement exclusivity;56 concurrent
private and public enforcement authority, sometimes with the

54. To be sure, injury in fact, which was developed in Association of Data Processing
Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970), differs from the legal injury test that it
displaced. Once more, however, these two variations on injury were also combined in the
conventional understanding of a justiciable suit at common law or earlier. Although there are
exceptions, the general supposition that rights and remedies were coextensive implies a
coalescence of the personal and legal aspects of an injury in the traditional understanding of a
legal claim.
55. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 6, at *39.
56. See, e.g., Occupational Safety & Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 659 (enforcement procedures
limited to the Secretary).
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executive power to close off private suits;57 or exclusive private
enforcement.58 This complex set of arrangements also allows for
specific instances of private enforcement under FCRA, as in Spokeo,
while providing a separate role for federal or state enforcement under
the same statute based, in part, on consumer complaints.59 It might
seem counterintuitive that Congress can empower private persons to
enforce public rights, but on reflection, it should not be.60 Although the
historical record has been disputed, there is evidence that before the
framing and in the early republic, private individuals enforced legal
actions that today we associate with executive enforcement power,
even sometimes including private enforcement of criminal laws.61
57. See, e.g., False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (subsection (a) allows Attorney General to
bring a civil action against a violator, and subsection (b) allows a “private person” to bring suit
against a violator on behalf of the person and the government, “in the name of the government”);
Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (private right of action) § 216(c) (actions by the
Secretary of Labor); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (private right of action unless the
Administrator or the State is “diligently prosecuting a civil action”).
58.
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Of course this statute contemplates private enforcement of
rights that the federal government generally has the power to otherwise enforce separately.
59. 15 U.S.C. 1681n (civil liability for willful noncompliance); 15 U.S.C. 1681s
(administrative enforcement procedures).
60. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Private Enforcement of Law, 4 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1 (1975).
61. The following provides an apt summary of the once-prevalent consensus among
academics concerning the relationship of modern standing doctrine to early federal judicial
practice:
In separate, major, and compelling efforts, Louis Jaffe in 1965, Raoul Berger in 1969,
and Steven Winter in 1988 have demonstrated that injury was not a requisite for
judicial authority in either the colonial, framing, or early constitutional periods. The
Judiciary Act of 1789, like several contemporaneous state statutes, allowed “informer”
actions. English practice included prerogative writs, mandamus, certiorari, and
prohibitions, all designed to “restrain unlawful or abusive action by lower courts or
public agencies,” and requiring only “neglect of justice,” not individual injury.
Stranger suits and relator practice countenanced the assertion of judicial power
without the existence of personal stakes in the controversy.
Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Justice Scalia, Standing, and Public Law Litigation, 42 DUKE L.J. 1141,
1151–52 (1993) (citations omitted); see also Maxwell L. Stearns, Standing and Social Choice:
Historical Evidence, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 309, 366–67 and cites therein; Cass R. Sunstein, What’s
Standing After Lujan? Of Citizens Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163 (1992).
More recently, the following article has contested some of these broad claims, see Caleb Nelson &
Ann Woolhandler, Does History Defeat Standing Doctrine?, 102 MICH. L. REV. 689 (2004).
Although the historical record concerning statutory standing contains some unambiguity, the
dispute concerning the antecedents to modern standing doctrine is most acute in the context of
legal claims arising directly from Constitution. This Essay’s thesis does not turn on resolving
these interesting historical debates, whether founded on contemporaneous English practice,
practices during the founding period, or practices shortly after the Constitution was ratified.
Because the thesis advanced here and in my earlier work, see supra note 32, and cites therein,
emphasizes the important functions that the modern standing doctrine serves, it is not in tension
with claims that the doctrine has earlier historical antecedents than some constitutional
historians have previously recognized. The goal of this Essay is instead to situate statutory
standing within a broader theoretical and doctrinal framework. That includes identifying the
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Of course the development of professional bureaucracies,
including criminal prosecutors’ offices, significantly curtailed reliance
on private enforcement for many rights so enforced in the framing
period,62 but that history does not undermine the central argument
here: We have two competing models of separation of powers that
create a tension in the context of congressional standing conferrals.
There are times when it is possible to find a middle ground between
two opposing theories. Reliance on balancing tests in certain criminal
procedure cases was often the product of such efforts,63 as was Justice
Powell’s attempt, and then Justice O’Connor’s, to find a middle
position between the opposing extremes on race-based affirmative
action.64 In the context of statutory standing, Justice Kennedy has
also sought a middle ground. Justice Kennedy concedes that Congress
may broaden the scope of injury, but he contends that in doing so, it
must tie its conferral to a specific class of individuals, presumably a
class that is narrower in scope than one susceptible to diffuse harm
status were they to rely on the Constitution alone as the basis for
standing to sue. Consider Kennedy’s famous passage from his Lujan
partial concurrence and partial concurrence in the judgment:
In my view, Congress has the power to define injuries and articulate chains of causation
that will give rise to a case or controversy where none existed before, and I do not read
the Court’s opinion to suggest a contrary view. In exercising this power, however,
Congress must, at the very least, identify the injury it seeks to vindicate and relate the
injury to the class of persons entitled to bring suit.65

Notably, Justice Kennedy did not concur in the judgment on
this very point; rather he chose to recast the majority opinion, which
he joined, rendering ironic his assertion about not reading the
majority opinion “to suggest a contrary view.”66 As Kennedy has
separation of powers underpinnings of the modern standing doctrine as it has been applied and
understood since the Progressive Era.
62. Stephen L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40
STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1414 (1988).
63. Michael R. Dreeben, Prefatory Article: The Confrontation Clause, the Law of
Unintended Consequences, and the Structure of Sixth Amendment Analysis, 34 GEO. L.J. ANN.
REV. CRIM. PROC. iii (2005); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1175 (1989) (decrying the use of balancing tests).
64. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. at Davis v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (permitting
reliance on race in medical school admissions provided it is not used as a quota, that it is a plus
factor in a holistic review of combined files); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (striking
algorithmic use of race in race-based affirmative action program at undergraduate level); Grutter
v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 206 (2003) (allowing reliance on race as part of holistic process despite
effectively replicating algorithmic function with careful daily review of law school admissions
reports).
65. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 580 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (citation omitted).
66. Id.
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shown, as a possible middle ground one can posit that Congress has
the power to broaden standing by statute, just not too much.
IV. SPOKEO AND THE PROBLEM OF STATUTORY STANDING REVISITED
One could similarly devise various middle ground opinions in
Spokeo. For example, the Court could rule for Robins by claiming that
in combination, Lujan and Laidlaw impose less stringent
standing requirements when the litigation is between private parties,
as opposed to when a private party sues a government official. There
is no foundation for this distinction within standing doctrine, which
likely explains why it did not form the basis for the doctrinal debate
between Justice Ginsburg and Justice Scalia in Laidlaw. This
distinction is also not persuasive as a matter of policy. As previously
shown, the decision to allow enforcement of congressional policy with
purely private litigation, public litigation, or various regimes in
between, represent points along a broader congressional policy
enforcement spectrum.67 The constitutional standing rules do not
change based upon where along that spectrum Congress chooses to
locate its enforcement scheme.68
Alternatively, the Court could rule for Robins on the ground
that whereas Lujan failed to link the injury in any specific way to the
individual claimants, it was Robins’s personal data that was
erroneously (if benignly) disclosed. Whereas the immediately
preceding account offers an unsatisfying distinction between Laidlaw
and Lujan, this theory fails altogether to account for Laidlaw, which
presented similarly attenuated claims to injury. It also creates a
further doctrinal tension with such cases as Trafficante v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,69 Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of
Bellwood,70 and Havens Realty v. Coleman.71 In each of these cases,
the Supreme Court granted standing based upon a federal statute that
expanded the scope of justiciable injury. In addition to allowing
67. See supra note 56–58, and cites therein.
68. Alternatively, one might analogize this distinction to the discredited non-delegation
doctrine. See, e.g., J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928). To the extent
that the doctrine remains relevant, however, it would seem to cut the other way, imposing more,
rather than less, restrictive limits on purely private actions.
69. 409 U.S. 205, 208–12 (1972) (construing Fair Housing Act to confer standing on testers
seeking to document standing even though they were not personally victims).
70. 441 U.S. 91, 111–15 (1979) (extending Trafficante to permit whites to raise challenge to
racial steering practices on ground that they were denied opportunity to reside within an
integrated community).
71. 455 U.S. 363, 382 (1982) (conferring standing on housing tester, under Fair Housing
Act, who was not in the market for rental property).
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standing to challenge a technical permit violation that produced no
harm, the Court has afforded standing to persons who were not
themselves victims of housing discrimination to challenge racial
steering practices in a variety of ways.72 This includes allowing testers
standing even though they themselves are not in the market for
housing, and expanding the scope of “injury” to include the loss of an
opportunity to reside in an integrated community even though the
claimants, once more, were not victims of the discriminatory practices
and appeared to be raising the claims of others who were.
These cases further support the Allen intuition that standing
doctrine affords Congress broad latitude in deciding who is permitted
to bring suit. Or, as stated in Linda RS v. Richard D.,73 “[t]he . . .
injury required by Art. III may exist solely by virtue of statutes
creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing.”74
Resolving Spokeo by narrowly distinguishing the Lujan facts
ultimately postpones an important question for another day, and it
does so at the expense of lower federal courts who must decide these
cases and of persons who rely on federal statues as the basis for their
legal claims and for standing to raise those claims.
This Essay has shown that the difficulty, and uncertainty,
arises as an inevitable feature of two competing premises concerning
the purpose of standing doctrine. This conflict ultimately involves the
nature of our representative democracy and its implications for the
scope of congressional power to choose preferred policy, including how
to have that policy enforced. Either Congress has the power to define
the scope of standing as a means of supplementing, or even
supplanting, executive enforcement for regulatory policy or it does not.
Failing to clarify this important constitutional inquiry leaves
Congress, the executive branch, and those who engage in statutory
enforcement in a state of ongoing uncertainty. For many observers,
the resulting unpredictability creates the not altogether unjustified
supposition that when standing restrictions are imposed, the unstated
motivation is dislike for the particular legislative policy. This occurred
in Lujan itself. Justice Blackmun accused Justice Scalia of having
undertaken “a slash-and-burn expedition through the law of
environmental standing,”75 and added that he had “difficulty
imagining this Court applying its rigid principles of geographic
formalism anywhere outside the context of environmental claims. As I
72.
73.
74.
75.

Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 208–12.
410 U.S. 614 (1973).
Id. at 617 n.3.
Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 606 (1992) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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understand it, environmental plaintiffs are under no special
constitutional standing disabilities.”76
At its Progressive-era inception, or reinvigoration,77 modern
standing doctrine served a set of liberal/Progressive causes. In more
recent decades in the Burger and Rehnquist Court periods, it served
as the basis for retrenching a once liberal set of rights. But until
Lujan, this was accomplished in the context of cases in which litigants
rested on the Constitution directly for standing. The Spokeo case does
not bring those issues before the Court. Despite these ideological
shifts, and despite claims in the literature to the contrary, the
composition of constitutional standing largely coheres.78 That is not to
suggest that no anomalies remain, but rather that the anomalies do
not challenge the foundations of standing and the underlying premises
of our constitutional adjudicatory system. The same cannot be said of
statutory standing, a doctrine that presently operates on two
conflicting premises that get to the heart of separation of powers.
Spokeo offers the Court a critical opportunity to set the record straight
and to clarify this important doctrine.
V. CONCLUSION
Spokeo is not a case about an obscure doctrine, an instance of
lawyer’s law. Rather it is a case that goes to the heart of our system of
governance. Conservatives frequently define themselves by
disclaiming a judicial pretense to upset legislative choice of policy, and
with good reason. Conservatism often equates with judicial humility.
In the context of statutory standing, humility has given way to hubris,
the sort that claims to protect congressional choice of policy by
preventing Congress from the very policy choices it has made. Lujan
manifested that mistake, thereby creating a tension that was destined
to arise, and that in fact did so in Laidlaw.
Spokeo provides the Court with a much-needed opportunity to
restore statutory standing to its proper constitutional foundations,
rested on the three-legged stool. The job of the Court is to preserve
and protect congressional primacy in lawmaking. A logical first step is
deferring when Congress chooses who has standing to enforce its
statutes.

76. Id. at 595.
77. See supra note 61, and cites therein (discussing debates over historical antecedents to
modern standing doctrine).
78. See supra note 34 (discussing reconciliation of standing case law).

